It seems that every time the European Union wants to redefine itself as an actor, war appears on the continent. This was the case in the 90s with the war in the Balkans. The EU was born with the Maastricht Treaty and the war made an appearance.
Today we are immersed in the preparation of the Conference on the future of Europe and the war has reappeared on the borders of the EU. The war of aggression launched by Russia in Ukraine represents what many political scientists call a critical junction: an event that acts as a turning point and changes the course of history.
Indeed it is, along with the 2003 Iraq war, the most recent threat to the founding principles of the United Nations.
The Covid-19 pandemic reminded us that citizens suffer from historical events and that our margin of action on them is really limited. If we add to this fact the confrontation of values launched by a system in which the community nullifies any yearning for freedom, it is not surprising that the greatest victim of the current situation is human security and, consequently, human rights.
These are seen by China and Russia as Western and not universal values. In the area of women’s rights (for example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), we find Russia talking about traditional rights with the desire to erase the existence of such rights from the international arena.
However, it must be added that this erosion has been accelerated by Trump’s United States, with the collaboration of some EU Member States such as Hungary and Poland. This leads us to wonder if the consequences of the war in Ukraine for the EU go beyond those initially scrutinized. Therefore, while many simply speak of the emergence of the EU as a geopolitical power as a result of these events, we believe that it is necessary to emphasize the following two elements.
The Europe of defense
First of all, the Europe of defense seems to be speeding up. This coincides at a time when the French presidency of the Council aims to build a sovereign EU in this field. Germany’s decision to increase its defense spending can also be read internally: to counterbalance the weight of France in this area. On this matter, it should be pointed out that a defense EU is not being built in Westphalian terms. In other words, the EU is not going to replace the role of the Member States, but rather it is going to speed up the transition (which was already under way) from exclusive competences (in the hands of the Member States) to shared ones (Commission, Parliament and Member states). This means that, within the EU, sovereignty will no longer be the main factor in the governance of national security.
Does Europe protect our values?
The second element focuses on protecting the backbone of our political systems. The EU is, in principle, the standard bearer of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Values that it has underpinned through treaties, with Lisbon being the most recent.
However, before our eyes, and with the approval of many institutions, different responses to these values have emerged. The liberal redefinition of the rule of law promoted by Hungary and Poland, the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 or the Covid-19 pandemic are clear examples of these trends. The Commission, when it seemed that it took such threats seriously, has tended to look the other way.
So, what defense of European values can be made abroad, when internally we have unresolved threats? Fortunately, President Zelensky seems to have woken the EU from its lethargy. A lethargy that had turned her into a passive and reactive force, forgetting the need to act to protect her value system.
Now it will be time to assess to what extent the EU of values exists and to what extent the Commission initiates the application of the protective shield that it has at its disposal (for example, Next Generation funds and the rule of law mechanism).
The emergence of an open international order
Many of us fear that this conflict supposes the definitive fragmentation of the international order with the appearance not of a new Cold War, but the emergence of the era of non-peace (unpeace), a systemic rivalry characterized by the inherent tensions between liberal democracies and authoritarianism. There are effects to be seen and actions to be done.
It is certain that the EU is responding to the crisis. Whether his performances serve to strengthen his position on the international board remains to be seen. However, crises serve, as Jean Monnet said, to advance the idea of Europe. We hope that this crisis will do so, and that, referring to the British writer and historian Tony Judt, in the future we will not talk about a time that was devoured by locusts.
